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Abstract
From the outset, European integration was about the transfer of powers from the national
to the European level, which evolved as explicit bargaining among governments or as an
incremental drift. This process was reframed with the competence issue entering the agenda
of constitutional policy. It now concerns the shape of the European multilevel polity as a whole,
in particular the way in which powers are allocated, delimited and linked between the different
levels. This Living Review article summarises research on the relations between the EU and
the national and sub-national levels of the member states, in particular on the evolution and
division of competences in a multilevel political system. It provides an overview on normative
reasonings on an appropriate allocation of competences, empirical theories explaining effective
structures of powers and empirical research.
The article is structured as follows: First, normative theories of a European federation
are discussed. Section 2 deals with legal and political concepts of federalism and presents
approaches of the economic theory of federalism in the context of the European polity. These
normative considerations conclude with a discussion of the subsidiarity principle and the con-
stitutional allocation of competences in the European Treaties. Section 3 covers the empirical
issue of how to explain the actual allocation of competences (scope and type) between levels.
Integration theories are presented here in so far as they explain the transfer of competence
from the national to the European level or the limits of this centralistic dynamics.
Normative and empirical theories indeed provide some general guidelines for evaluation and
explanations of the evolution of competences in the EU, but they both contradict the assump-
tion of a separation of power. The article therefore concludes that politics and policy-making
in the EU have to be regarded as multilevel governance (Section 4). The main theoretical
approaches and results from empirical research on European multilevel governance are sum-
marised before we sketch suggestions for further discussion and research in the field (Section 5).
Keywords: European integration, federalism, fiscal federalism, integration theory, multilevel
governance, subsidiarity, competences
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1 Introduction
The division of competences (i.e. legally defined powers) between the EU and its member states
has been one of the most important issues in the discussion on the institutional reform and in the
processes of Treaty amendment. From the outset, European integration was about the transfer
of powers from the national to the European level, which evolved as explicit bargaining among
governments or as an incremental drift. With the competence issue entering the agenda of con-
stitutional policy set out with the Convention process, this process was reframed. While power
refers to the capability of a government, an institution or an actor to make policies or to pursue
interests, the notion of competence refers to the reasons and the limits to apply powers. Thus
the discussion is shifted to the normative, if not constitutional aspect. It concerns the shape of
the European multilevel polity, in particular the way in which powers are allocated, delimited and
linked between the different levels. Without going into the details of particular policies, we focus
on principles, rules, and processes of competence allocation.
The normative discussion on competences cannot and should not be isolated from the empirical
questions of why and which competences are allocated in reality. First of all, the actual structure
of the EU did not result from a deliberate constitutional design but from an ongoing integration
process. Second, the competence issue arose in the wake of increasing tensions caused by the
dynamics of European integration (Majone 2004). In order to avoid an abstract normative analysis,
we have to understand the driving forces of this process. Third, in processes of institutional reform
or constitutional policy, normative arguing is enmeshed with bargaining over power (Elster 1998),
and the outcome of these processes is influenced by reasons and interests. Therefore, research on
the “vertical” dimension of the multilevel system should cover both aspects.
From these two perspectives, the following review article summarises research on the relations
between the EU and the national and sub-national level. Section 2 covers contributions to nor-
mative theories of a European federation. The focus is on significant works by political scientists,
but we also refer to publications by lawyers and economists, which are relevant in this context.
Section 3 deals with the empirical issue of how to explain the actual allocation of power between
levels. Here, our intention is not to give a comprehensive survey of integration theory (Pollack
2005; Rosamond 2000; Wiener and Diez 2009). We will present publications in this field in a
selective way, i.e. only in so far as they explain the transfer of competence from the national to
the European level or the limits of this centrifugal dynamic.
The final part discusses the consequences of the vertical allocation of powers for European
governance (Section 4). As both normative and empirical theories contradict the assumption of
a separation of power, politics and policy-making in the EU have to be regarded as multilevel
governance. We will summarise the main approaches and findings from empirical research before
we end with conclusions and recommendations for further research (Section 5).
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2 Normative theories: Criteria for competence allocation
between member states and the EU
The allocation of competences between the member states and the EU is a decisive aspect de-
termining the character of the emerging European polity. For this reason, the debate on the
competence issue is narrowly linked with the controversies on the finalite´ of European integration.
Right from the beginning, this process and the debates on its aims have been influenced by the
idea of an “ever closer Union”, i.e. a European federation (Burgess 2000). Although it soon turned
out to be unrealistic to create a supranational federal state given the interests of member state
governments to maintain their powers, federalism remained an important normative concept in
political discussions and research (Bogdandy 1999; Nicola¨ıdis and Howse 2001). Recently, scholars
have proposed using it as a descriptive concept as well, in order to carve out the features of the EU
polity in comparison with existing federations, in particular with the U.S. and Switzerland (Bo¨rzel
and Hosli 2003; Cappelletti, Seccombe, and Weiler 1986; Fabbrini 2005; McKay 2001; Menon and
Schain 2006; Sbragia 1992; Schu¨tze 2009; Trechsel 2005), but sometimes also with other federal
states (e.g. Heinemann-Gru¨der 2002; Kelemen 2004).
2.1 Concepts of federalism
The concept of a federation has implications for the allocation of powers between the European
and the national level, depending on whether it points to a federal or confederal polity. Scholars
supporting the idea of a federal Europe or regarding it as a legal reality conclude that the EU
needs a constitution defining the division of powers (Auer 2005). How powers should be actually
allocated to the different levels is left open, but the notion of a federal Europe implies a limitation
of the EU’s competences as well as representative institutions empowered to make decision-making
by qualified majority rule, i.e. a structure that allows for further integration (Trechsel 2005). From
a normative point of view, federalists usually tend to plea for a European government with all
powers to fulfil regulative, distributive and redistributive functions.
In fact, this idea – which was supported by leading European politicians during the 1950s and
1960s – has shifted to the background. Although it gained new momentum during the discussion
on the Constitutional Treaty, scholars widely acknowledged that the EU combines federal and
confederal elements (Burgess 2000: 260–265; Elazar 2001: 36–37) and they only disagree on the
relative weight of these elements. Giandomenico Majone (2004) explained this mixed structure –
which, in his view, leads the EU into serious dilemmas – as the result of an integration dynamic
fostered mainly by executives. Following Fritz W. Scharpf (1999), he strongly makes the case for a
confederal Europe with powers limited to regulatory policies of “negative integration”, while under
the condition of social heterogeneity, redistributive policies should be left to the member states.
Hence, competences of the EU should be restricted to those required for a market-preserving
federalism (Weingast 1995): “Aside from foreign and security policy, the public agenda would
mostly include efficiency-enhancing, market-preserving policies – a combination of liberalization
and negative integration measures to remove obstacles to the free movement of people, services,
goods, and capital within the territory of the federation. [. . . ] In contrast, redistributive policies
can only be legitimated by majority decisions and hence place too heavy a burden on the fragile
normative foundations of a transnational policy” (Majone 2004: 191). Reflecting on the plurality
of the European “demoi” and the social inequalities between member states, others plea for a
polycentric polity resulting from flexible integration (Wind 2003). With this concept the allocation
of competence would not only depend on constitutional rules but also on member states’ decisions
on “enhanced cooperation” or “opting-out”.
The problem with both the federal and the confederal model is that they cannot determine in
detail which competences should be allocated to the EU and which should remain at the national
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or sub-national level. “Federalists” make the decision a matter of constitutional policy-making, but
they cannot provide a convincing normative theory of centralisation and decentralisation, not to
speak of proposals for coping with interdependent tasks cutting across levels. In the same manner,
“confederalists” ignore that negative and positive integration, efficiency-enhancing regulation and
redistributive policies cannot be clearly distinguished. Independent of the issues at stake, most
policies have redistributive implications which are obvious if we consider the effects of a free flow
of goods, services and capital in the market on the territorial distribution of wealth. Efficiency-
enhancement is a positive-sum game, but in the end some may profit more than others, considering
the fact that in many cases external effects occur. All this makes it impossible to clearly delimit
the EU’s competences according to the proposed categories. Apparently, it is more appropriate
to characterise the EU as a “compound” polity in which power is diffused and shared between
different institutions at different levels (Fabbrini 2008; Kincaid 1999).
Nonetheless, regardless of its nature, a multilevel polity requires rules for some kind of allocation
of powers between levels and political mechanisms designed to enforce these rules. Therefore, the
normative debate on the kind of the European constitution necessarily raised the competence
issue. Political scientists mainly contributed to discussions on the second question of how to
enforce competence rules. The first question has been dealt with by lawyers and economists.
While lawyers have proposed principles and categories of rules (e.g. exclusive, concurrent, shared
competence), including rules for coping with rule conflicts, economic theory of federalism claims to
provide substantial criteria for determining how specific competences should be allocated between
levels.
2.2 Economic theory of federalism
Economic theory of federalism (Oates 1999, 2005) states that, in principle, powers of governments
should be allocated to the lowest possible level. This principle of decentralisation (which conforms
to the principle of subsidiarity) is supported by at least three arguments: First, decentralisation
increases the chance that policy-making follows the preferences of citizens and that powers can
effectively be controlled by citizens. Therefore, the more a society in a federal system reveals
territorial cleavages, i.e. the more citizens with similar preferences are concentrated in regions,
the more policies are to be decentralised. Second, if citizens are mobile, a decentralised polity
gives them the opportunity to choose between jurisdictions in which governments offer different
units in which governments offer different sets of public policies. Third, competition between
decentralised governments induced by mobile tax-payers increases the efficiency of public policies,
as governments have to provide for an optimal ratio of services and tax burden. On the other hand,
for many policies, decentralised units are too small for effective governance and intergovernmental
coordination causes considerable costs. Hence, centralisation of competences is justified if common
goods reach beyond the scope of lower level governments, if they produce external effects, or
if they cannot exploit economies of scale. Moreover, negative dynamics of competition require
central regulation and so do economic disparities in public revenues which violate social norms
of distributive justice (summarised in: Blankart 2007; Oates 2005; Persson, Ge´rard, and Tabellini
1997).
These arguments played an important role in discussions on the Stability and Growth Pact and
the size of the EU’s budget. According to traditional reasoning on economic federalism, macroeco-
nomic policy requires a central government to coordinate fiscal policies of lower level governments.
Otherwise competing member states tend to exploit the common good of economic stability and
growth in the common market. Redistributive policies at the European level determined to support
regions in need are defended in order to countervail territorial disparities of economic development.
However, both pleas for competence transfers to the EU have been contested. Economists and po-
litical scientists have criticised the ineffectiveness or instability of the current allocation of powers
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between the EU and its member states in these policy fields or they have pointed out the political
costs of centralisation (summarised in: Alves 2007; Hallerberg 2006; McKay 2005).
According to this theory of federalism, inter-jurisdictional competition is a decisive reason for
determining the allocation of competences. While until the 1990s the predominating model as-
sumed that jurisdictions compete for mobile tax-payers and regarded this process as driven by
the market mechanism (competing decentralised governments provide public goods demanded by
private actors with the tax constituting a kind of price that has to be paid for public goods),
some literature now has introduced a different model of competition which has different impli-
cations for the vertical allocation of competences. According to this concept of a “laboratory
federalism” (Oates 1999: 1132–1134), horizontal intergovernmental competition in a decentralised
political system should lead to experimentation with new policies and the diffusion of innovation
(Salmon 1987; Breton 1996; Kerber 2005; Kerber and Eckardt 2007; Oates 1999). Again, theory
tells us that decentralisation should be preferred to centralisation as it promises the selection of
best policies. But this result cannot be expected to come to the fore under all conditions, the
most important being adequate incentives for governments to innovate and to mutually learn from
each other. If decentralised governments search for mobile resources, they are strongly induced to
improve policies in terms of efficiency, but this can lead them to a “race-to-the-bottom” in terms of
quality of public goods or to ignoring external effects. Therefore, scholars like Albert Breton and
Pierre Salmon maintained that incentives can be set by the intra-jurisdictional democratic process.
In that case, they depend “on the possibility and willingness of citizens to make assessments of
comparative performance‘”. Only “[i]f these conditions are fulfilled, comparisons will serve as a
basis for rewarding politicians in power (re-electing them) or sanctioning them (voting for their
competitors)” (Salmon 1987: 32). Leaving aside the question of whether citizens are able or willing
to comparatively evaluate the performance of their government, incentive problems can occur if
governments make policies without considering the will of their citizens and if accountability mech-
anisms are deficient (Kerber and Eckardt 2007: 237). These reasons imply that decentralisation
may come to its limits with the consequence that interjurisdictional competition fails without cen-
tral regulation. Therefore, mechanisms like budget constraints, rating or performance standards
are recommended.
It is interesting to note that with this focus on the interplay of intergovernmental and intragov-
ernmental politics, the economic theory of federalism approaches political theories of multilevel
governance (Blankart 2007; Persson, Ge´rard, and Tabellini 1997). However, this makes the evalu-
ation of costs and benefits of an allocation of competences to the EU much more difficult than in
the basic model. In fact, one can argue that deficits in democratic politics at the EU level speak for
decentralisation. However, in the same way the argument can be turned against decentralisation
if one puts the emphasis on incentive deficits. On balance, political economy tends to recommend
more decentralisation of competences, but also more effective decision-making at the European
level by applying majority rule in order to enable the EU to fulfil coordinative and regulative
functions (e.g. Blankart 2007; Salmon 2003: 128–129). As a rule, the recommendations for the
allocation of competences between nation states and the EU remain rather abstract and rarely
refer to particular policies.
In political debates, the economic reasoning on federalism has often been used to support pleas
for a separation of powers. In fact, the economic model of a competitive federalism presupposes
“fiscal equivalence” (Olson Jr 1969). It requires a government to take account of all costs and ben-
efits of a public policy. But arguments for and against decentralisation or centralisation may vary
regarding regulative, administrative and fiscal functions of a policy. Moreover, the optimal degree
of decentralisation or centralisation depends on the size of a jurisdiction with the consequence that
the smallest unit of a multilevel system may decide on the vertical structure. As a consequence,
sharing of powers often turns out to be inevitable.
In view of this problem, Frey and Eichenberger (1999) proposed a model of functionally over-
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lapping competing jurisdictions (FOCJ). The authors assumed that public services and demand
for services by consumers “extend very differently over space and have different degrees of scale
economies (or diseconomies)” (Frey and Eichenberger 1999: 5). Therefore, the traditional or-
ganisation of the public sector, where a government provides different services in multi-purpose
jurisdictions, should be substituted by governance in functionally specialised jurisdictions. As a
consequence, a multilevel polity would constitute overlapping jurisdictions competing for the sup-
port of citizens as claimed by the economic theory of federalism. Frey and Eichenberger suggested
that at least regional policy in Europe can be organised according to their model. Beyond that the
FOCJ-model should provide a promising guideline for European integration under the condition of
high diversity of national economies and cultures. According to the authors, ideals like “variable
geometry” or European integration by different speeds (“Europe a` la carte”) come close to this
theory of federalsim (Frey and Eichenberger 1999: 79).
Frey and Eichenberger constructed a theoretical framework for the allocation of competences
in a territorially differentiated polity. Their proposition that jurisdictions should be constituted by
referenda goes beyond what appears to be practicable in real politics. Nevertheless, this particular
model of a federation is not utterly idealistic and it caught the attention of scholars interested in
comparative research. Aiming at an analytical concept for EU multilevel governance, Hooghe and
Marks (2003) suggested that, in contrast to territorial federalism, functional federalism should be
considered as particularly relevant in governance beyond the nation state.
However, these models of federalism, to which more could be added, leave us with the unre-
solved problem of how to allocate competences between the constituent units, be they territorial or
functional jurisdictions. This sceptical conclusion has found support by Daniel Treisman. Wrap-
ping up a comprehensive review of the relevant literature he states that normative theories give no
reasons for or against a particular allocation of powers. “In short, it is hard to reach any general
conclusion whether political – or administrative, or fiscal – decentralization will improve or impair
the quality of government or economic performance. They will have different effects driving in
different directions on different dimensions. These effects depend on numerous conditions, many
of which are difficult to disentangle in theory or to identify in practice” (Treisman 2007: 274).
Beyond this, it is interesting to note that normative theories inspired by the economic reasoning
on federalism increasingly tend to deviate from the original premise of a clear separation of pow-
ers and now react to the multidimensional and multilevel character of tasks governments have to
fulfil. This leads them either to accept an allocation of competences differing between legislation,
administration and financing or to reflect on a functionally differentiated organisation of jurisdic-
tions. In either case, coordination of interdependent decisions made by institutions at different
levels is essential. Aside from managing coordination and accountability, an interlocked multilevel
system is challenged by instability due to opportunistic application of powers and need to adjust
competences to changing need (Bednar 2009).
2.3 Subsidiarity principle and constitutional delimitation of powers
Attempts to clearly sort out competences increase the risk of “authority migration” (Bednar 2004)
beyond the scope that is accepted by citizens or necessary for an efficient policy. This has led
scholars to inquire into safeguards against this trend. On the one hand, they proposed rules for a
delimitation of competences in the Treaties; on the other hand, the discussion concerned procedures
designed to prevent uncontrolled shifts of powers and to solve conflicts on their application.
One aspect of this discussion concerned the legal statement of competences in the Treaties. In
an influential article, Bruno de Witte and Gra´inne de Bu´rca argued against an extensive catalogue
of competences. Instead, they proposed to define categories of EU powers and to distinguish
exclusive, shared and complementary competences in order to bring more clarity into the existing
system (de Witte and de Bu´rca 2002). Moreover, they pleaded for more precise definitions of
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legal measures the EU can take. The authors warned against too strict regulations which may
reduce the flexibility and adaptability of the EU. Their work has apparently influenced the relevant
articles of the failed Constitutional Treaty and the Lisbon Treaty. With the ammended Treaty on
the European Union, exclusive and shared competences are defined, whereas the third category
including coordinating, supportive and supplementary competences still lacks the clarity required
by constitutional lawyers.
Still, as Robert Schu¨tze has revealed in a comparative study on American and European federal
principles, the vertical order of the EU conforms to a cooperative type of federalism rather than
to a dual type (Schu¨tze 2009). From this follows the relevance of rules determining how shared
competences are used. Schu¨tze convincingly shows that the constitutionalisation of shared powers
necessarily entails the entrenchment of the principle of subsidiarity. Following the development of
European law after Maastricht, this principle has acquired a prominent role in research. While
lawyers tried to define the substance of these principles and to assess the potential consequences
of their application in cases of dispute, political scientists have engaged in comparative research in
order to evaluate the prospects and limits of such a constitutional rule.
This research has been guided by the premise that it is not the content or the formulation
of a subsidiarity clause in the Treaty which constrains powers of the EU. This clause necessarily
remains ambiguous, like “incomplete contracts” (Soriano 2007). Rather it is the procedures of
enforcing these principles that allow for controlling a drift of competences to the EU. In view of
empirical evidence on relevant jurisprudence in federal states (Berman 1994; Thorlakson 2006)
and considering decisions of the European Court of Justice, which still drives integration rather
than reinforces subsidiarity (de Bu´rca 1998; Estella de Noriega 2002; Ho¨pner 2008; Ho¨reth 2008),
political scientists rely more on political mechanisms, on participation of lower level institutions,
either of national governments in the Council (Scharpf 2009: 198-200; sceptical Ho¨reth 2008:
320-366) or of national parliaments. Therefore, the procedure of subsidiarity control by national
parliaments, invented during the elaboration of the Constitutional Treaty and now established in
the Treaty, is mostly supported although scholars are well aware of the limits of this device (Cooper
2006; Raunio 2005).
Based on an elaborated theory and comparative research, Filippov, Ordeshook, and Shvetsova
(2004) raised doubts on the stabilizing effects of constitutional rules and constitutional courts.
Instead, they suggest creating an integrated party system linking actors from all levels. In such a
political structure, where all parties have the opportunity to gain power at each level, incentives to
concentrate competences at one level are reduced. Whether the evolution of such a party system
is a realistic option in the EU is debatable. Some scholars provided evidence for the emergence
or the existence of a European party system. But so far its vertical integration is rather weak,
even if some institutional factors like the extended powers of the EP and the structures of joint
decision-making might work in this direction (Thorlakson 2005). It is more convincing to expect
a “robust” federal order by a combination of existing or evolving political and juridical safeguards
as suggested by Jenna Bednar (2009).
To sum up: In view of the integration dynamics after the Single European Act, the issue of
how to delimit powers of the EU became an important subject of research. It has been stimulated
by the Convention working on a constitution for Europe which was triggered by the debate on the
democratic deficit, but also by the decline of the “permissive consensus” on European integration.
So far, normative theories on federalism have shown that the problem can hardly be solved by
constitutional rules defining competences for each level. Regardless of the need of general guidelines
for the allocation of competences, the real challenge is to find mechanisms for stabilising the
endogenous dynamics of competence migration between levels. The procedure of subsidiarity
control by national parliaments makes sense from this point of view. However, beyond dealing with
precedures that are established in the Treaty and appending protocols, scholars should analyse why
power shifts in the EU multilevel system. In this regard, all theories of federalism have their limits
(Benson and Jordan 2008).
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3 Empirical research: Explaining the transfer
of competences from member states to the EU
In principle, a shift of power from the nation states to the emerging European polity has always
been the central subject of European studies. The oft-cited early approaches and theories of inter-
national and European integration were initially meant to explain the enhancing intergovernmental
cooperation as well as to issue expectations about the direction and end-state, or rather limits,
of the observed processes. Meanwhile, scholars look at European integration from a broader and
historical perspective on political structuring, center formation, system building and state society
relations (Bartolini 2005; Piattoni 2009). We do not include this strand of literature which goes
beyond our focus on the territorial dimension. In contrast, we review those works on integration
theory which, implicitly or explicitly, have given theoretical accounts of why certain competences
and parts of national sovereignty would be transferred to a supranational polity.
3.1 Functionalist theories
The early functionalist approach, closely connected with its key representative David Mitrany
(1943), promotes the delegation of administrative government tasks to functionally differentiated
international agencies set up for efficient problem-solving and the provision of welfare, in an eco-
nomic as well as in a social and cultural sense (Taylor 1968: 406). Cooperation along functional
lines seemed at that time most beneficial in domains such as railway, shipping, aviation and broad-
casting, whereas the coordination of production, trade and distribution would prove more difficult
(Mitrany 1943: 33). According to functionalists, international agencies would initially have to
deal only with mere technocratic matters, whereas political decisions, implying redistributive con-
sequences for citizens and social groups, would be achieved intergovernmentally (Mitrany 1943:
37). Yet, governments might decide to delegate specific functional decision-making powers to
autonomous experts at a supranational level (Mitrany 1943: 52–53), which could make national
governments eventually superfluous in those fields (Taylor 1968: 404).It is worth noting, how-
ever, that functionalists did not support limiting cooperation to artificially constructed regional
boundaries (Mitrany 1943: 32; see also Mitrany 1975, for an appraisal of ECSC and Euratom).
In their attempt to theorise the new phenomenon of European regional integration, neo-
functionalists picked up these arguments in the 1950s. In his extensive case study of the ECSC,
first published in 1958, Ernst Haas (1968) acknowledged that member states expected economic
benefits from delegating tasks of supervision and implementation to a supranational High Author-
ity (later called Commission), but placed greater emphasis on automatic processes of spill-over to
other economic and political spheres, firstly to atomic energy (Euratom), tariffs and trade (Haas
1968: 301), then subsequently into the fields of wage and social security systems, currency and
credit, tax systems, investment planning etc. (1968: 103 and 311). According to Haas (1968: 525),
substantial agenda-setting powers had been transferred to the High Authority because it provided
a necessary “federal arena for action” to the ministers of the member states in the Council.
As the integration process slowed down, the assumption of a linear growth of European compe-
tences had to be reconsidered, and with it the supremacy of functional needs over political interests.
Therefore, neo-functionalists adjusted their theoretical framework and put more and more empha-
sis on influences exerted by non-state actors, especially industry and other pressure groups, and
on interests of the member state governments themselves (Lindberg 1963; Lindberg and Schein-
gold 1970; Schmitter 1971). Leon Lindberg and Stuart Scheingold Lindberg and Scheingold (1970)
traced a pattern of fluctuation in the integration process and developed a framework covering dif-
ferent types of outcomes. Their theory allowed for the possibility of spill-back in policy areas where
“[t]he scope of Community action and its institutional capacities decrease” and community “[r]ules
are no longer regularly enforced or obeyed” by member state governments (Lindberg and Schein-
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gold 1970: 137). Spill-back occurs when governments decide to renationalise decisive tasks or prefer
to deal with them in an intergovernmental manner, although the respective competences might
have been explicitly assigned to community institutions before. In the opposed case of forward
linkage, a coalition of supporters at the national level and political leadership by the Commission
and heads of member states increases the scope of action or capacities of supranational institu-
tions in an incremental way. The most comprehensive model of systems transformation refers to
a substantial and far reaching extension of community boundaries in geographical or functional
terms, meaning that competences of community institutions are augmented considerably, often on
the basis of a new treaty. In their book, the authors presented case studies portraying spill-back
in the coal sector and forward linkage in agricultural policy. The development of the EEC treaty
was considered as an example of successful systems transformation.
Later on, several scholars revisited functionalist ideas, seeking to evolve and refine the concepts
in the light of new empirical developments. Dorette Corbey (1995) e.g., adopted the notion of
dialectical functionalism to explain a cyclical pattern of progress and stagnation in European inte-
gration. Phases of extension of Community competences are followed by protectionist responses of
member states and interest groups in adjacent policy areas. When national regulation becomes too
costly again, a further competence transfer is induced. Likewise, Arne Niemann (2006) describes
European integration as a non-deterministic and dialectical process. These modified theoretical
frameworks are attempts to overcome the static character of neo-functionalism by emphasising
the mutual interactions of agents and structure at the national and supranational levels, thereby
providing an explanation for the overall “stop-and-go pattern” of the integration process.
Along the same lines, Alec Stone Sweet and Wayne Sandholtz (Stone Sweet and Sandholtz
1997; Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 1998) have framed a “supranationalist” approach to account
for variations in competence allocation and EC rule-making. According to them, community
competences in a policy sector are determined by the level of transnational transactions (i.e. trade,
establishment of European interest groups etc.) and the resulting societal demand for EC rules
and regulations. As a result, more and more common market competences have been centralised,
the most notable examples being European regulation in the telecommunications sector and the
European airline industry.
Thus, neo-functionalist theories explain a sectorally and temporally differentiated evolution of
European integration, but provide no precise criteria for determining which policies tend to be
affected by positive or negative spill-overs.
3.2 Intergovernmentalist theories
The empty chair crisis and the Luxembourg compromise, which seemed to have stopped the in-
tegration process or even caused several steps backwards, meant hard times for neo-functionalist
scholars even beyond the days of Eurosclerosis in the 1970s. At the same time, political events or
rather non-events heralded the beginning of a long-lasting heyday of intergovernmentalist research
on European integration. Intergovernmentalists took on a completely different perspective towards
European integration, looking at state actors and the concept of national sovereignty in interstate
relations. Stanley Hoffmann’s (1964; 1966) work marked the beginning of a neorealist reasoning in
European integration research, focussing on governments, while later Andrew Moravcsik extended
this approach towards a “liberal intergovernmentalism” by including the role of other actors in the
member states.
Hoffmann (1964) did not completely reject the neo-functional notion of spill-over processes and
the coordination of policies under shared institutions on a supranational level, but only accepted
it in the realm of low politics, i.e. in industry and trade policy, and to some extent in agriculture,
monetary and competition policy (1964: 89). According to his reasoning, a transfer of competences
to supranational institutions prevents nation states from losing control in increasingly interdepen-
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dent economic domains. In high politics (military and foreign policy), on the other hand, national
interests are conflicting (Hoffmann 1964: 90). As political integration does not have “sufficient
potency to promise a permanent excess of gains over losses” (Hoffmann 1964: 882), it would not
lie in the rational self-interest of member states to pool sovereignty in this area.
Andrew Moravcsik (1993, 1998) used these assumptions as a starting point to develop his lib-
eral intergovernmentalist approach of European integration by examining the grand bargains in EC
history. In this view, the “delegation and pooling of specific and precise powers” is best explained
by the eagerness of governments to credibly commit themselves vis-a`-vis the other member states
or domestic groups, whereas “patterns of support for more general institutional commitments”
(Moravcsik 1998: 488, emphasis in original), such as the institutional form of the EC, including
the gradual empowerment of the European Parliament, rather depend on the relative importance
of federalist ideology in the member states. Moravcsik (1998) analysed in detail the successive
instances of delegation of member state sovereignty – starting with the Treaties of Rome in areas
of tariff and trade negotiations and culminating at Maastricht with the creation of a strong and
autonomous central bank when member states with conflicting interests sought to settle a cred-
ible anti-inflationary mandate. But he always stressed the explicit limitations of scope and the
simultaneous or subsequent adoption of control mechanisms by the member states.
3.3 Neo-institutionalist theories
Taking a similar point of departure, Mark Pollack (1997, 2003) elaborated a rational choice
principal-agent model to explain delegation, discretion and member state control of supranational
institutions in the EU. Pollack draws on Garrett’s (1992) earlier analysis of member states’ long-
term interests to accept ECJ jurisdiction even if it is unfavourable to them. He related actual
competences of the Commission and the Court to their theoretical agency functions, i.e. moni-
toring compliance, solving problems of incomplete contracting, issuing secondary legislation, and
formal agenda-setting. In addition, he explained the numerous constraints and control mecha-
nisms set up by member state principals to limit the scope of agent’s power and discretion, such
as the comitology committee procedures or the threat of non-compliance with ECJ rulings (Pol-
lack 2003). Based on this principal-agent framework, Jonas Tallberg (2002) develops a theory of
dynamic linkages between stages of delegation. He argued that the experiences with existing in-
stitutional arrangements influence national governments’ future decisions on delegation and their
interaction with European actors, which can explain why a transfer of powers to the EU does not
always take place and often develops gradually.
Fabio Franchino (2007) took up the arguments of principal-agent theory to elaborate a formal
model of delegation. Based on this model he analysed delegation to national and supranational
agents in the EU. Unlike Pollack and Tallberg, he did not concentrate on treaty delegation but
scrutinised decisions to delegate executive powers via secondary legislation. Yet he – like Pollack –
considered conflicting preferences between member states as well as decision rules as independent
variables. Beyond that, Renaud Dehousse (2008) shed light on another facet of executive delegation
in the EU when accounting for the relative weakness of European regulatory agencies, like e.g.
the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) or the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA).
Dehousse pointed out that autonomy and powers of regulatory agencies are rather limited due to
multiple principals (member states, Commission, EP) with diverging preferences which have a say
in the delegation decisions and the institutional design of agencies. This “multiplicity of principals”
(2008: 795) inhibits a broader transfer of powers from national authorities to European agencies.
Other researchers followed the trend of “rediscovering institutions” in political science theories,
as had George Tsebelis and Geoffrey Garrett Tsebelis and Garrett (2001). With their rational
choice institutionalist model, they accounted for the ability of the Commission and the Court
of Justice to extend their discretion and move policy outcomes closer to their own preferences
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compared to the Council of Ministers. Tsebelis and Garrett held that discretion of supranational
actors is dependent on the legislative procedures laid down in the treaties. These institutional rules
determine how difficult it is for the Council to pass new legislation and overrule the Commission
or the Court. Therefore, the Commission and the ECJ managed to switch autonomy and com-
petences to the supranational level by means of policy implementation, legislative agenda-setting
and proactive court rulings.
Based on similar theoretical grounds, but in a less formal way, Adrienne He´ritier (2007) used
several case studies to develop an institutionalist account of the long-term development of formal
and informal rules in the EU’s decision-making process. Regarding treaties as incomplete contracts,
He´ritier explained European integration as an interplay of formal Treaty changes and “interstitial”
adjustment of rules, an interplay that can develop in different sequences. While focussing on
decision rules in the EU, this approach was also used to understand changes in the allocation of
power, as outlined by Henry Farrell and Adrienne He´ritier (2007).
In the same realm, an extensive body of literature on legal integration, mostly in a neo-
functionalist tradition, but emphasising the dynamic effects of institutions (Burley and Mattli
1993; Alter 1996; Dehousse 1998; Stone Sweet 2004), highlighted the role of the ECJ. According to
these authors, the Court, via expansive interpretation of treaty provisions and the setting of legal
precedents, has considerably influenced competences by monitoring and interpreting community
law. Moreover, by elaborating the doctrines of direct effect and supremacy, and particularly by
exploiting the procedure of preliminary rulings (Art. 267 TFEU), it has acquired the substantive
power to intervene into the legal systems of the member states. Once the Court had achieved these
powers, it became increasingly difficult for politicians to overrule its decisions unless the member
state governments decide to amend the treaties or pass new and potentially contested legislation
in the Council of Ministers (Alter 1996; Ho¨reth 2008). Furthermore, ECJ rulings proved not to
be confined to purely economic and deregulatory matters corresponding to the Court’s function
as a safeguard of the common market. Rather, they promoted a “re-embedding” of markets at
the supranational level and fostered a transnational regime for the protection of citizens’ rights
(Caporaso and Tarrow 2009), which gradually extended to areas such as health and safety at work,
social welfare benefits, mutual recognition of educational and professional qualifications and polit-
ical participation rights (Burley and Mattli 1993: 66; see also the case studies on sex equality and
environmental protection in Stone Sweet 2004).
By applying a historical institutionalist approach, Paul Pierson (1996) proposed a similar but
more general reasoning (see also Armstrong and Bulmer 1998). Pierson aimed at explaining why
gaps, i.e. “significant divergences between institutional and policy preferences of member states
and the actual functioning of institutions and policies” (1996: 131) emerge. The gaps reveal a loss
of member state sovereignty to the European level which was not anticipated. Pierson’s research
focussed on the diverging time horizons of actors at the national and supranational levels due to
member state politicians’ preoccupation with short-term concerns, the instability of member state
policy preferences over time, and unintended consequences. His case studies on European social
policy amply demonstrated the ensuing processes of competence shifts to the European level.
Although there have been attempts to apply rational choice arguments in order to under-
stand how member states deal with unintended consequences of delegation (e.g. (Ko¨nig 2008)),
neo-institutionalist approaches still have difficulties to predict the outcome of path-dependent de-
velopments or to explain the conscious delegation, maintenance or reestablishment of national
sovereignty in specific areas. This is the reason why policy- and actor-centred approaches became
relevant.
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3.4 Policy- and actor-centred approaches
From a policy science perspective, Giandomenico Majone (1996) suggested to distinguish between
regulatory and direct-expenditure (i.e. redistributive or distributive policies) programmes. In
this analytical framework, the EU comes close to a “regulatory state”. Almost exclusively deal-
ing with regulatory policies to compensate market failures, it has a much lesser stake in direct
(re)distributive programmes. Even though in some areas regulatory policy-making and implemen-
tation are centralised at the European level, whereas in others patterns of co-ordinated partnership
evolve, “both in economic and in social regulation, policy initiatives in the member states are in-
creasingly likely to derive from an agenda established at the European rather than the domestic
level” (1996: 265–266). Thus the actual regulatory competences are shifted to the European level
even when formally executed by the member states, which considerably lowers the autonomous
problem-solving capacity of national governments. As R. Daniel Kelemen (2003, 2004) has shown,
this functional division of power conforms to the interests of the EU and the member states, and
it can be observed in other federal systems, too. What varies according to Kelemen’s theory is the
discretion granted to lower level governments in implementing laws. If power at the central level is
fragmented, as is the case in the EU, central institutions are expected to pass detailed regulations
in order to avoid bureaucratic drift, i.e. watering down in implementation, and political drift, i.e.
a reversal of policies if a new coalition comes to power. In the same vein, Scharpf’s (1999) analysis
of problem-solving capacities at the European and the national level was based on the distinction
between negative integration, where the Commission and the ECJ dispose of broad competences
and institutional strength for the “removal of tariffs, quantitative restrictions, and other barriers
to trade or obstacles to free and undistorted competition” (1999: 45), and positive integration,
where “[t]he existence of ideological, economic, and institutional differences among member states
will obviously make agreement on common European regulations extremely difficult, and in many
cases impossible” (1999: 82).
These findings hold true as long as the dynamics of integration mainly depends on the power
of national governments in relation to supranational actors. The more decisions on European
integration are “politicised” in national societies and the more political parties or sub-national
actors enter the arena of European politics, the more the vertical allocation of competence turns
into a matter of political or social conflicts. The actor-centred explanation of European integration
was introduced when empirical studies discovered the role of regional governments. While the
Commission supported them in order to implement European programmes, they actively defended
their powers (Marks 1996; Jeffery 1997). More recently, political parties have been discovered as
actors in the integration process. As a study by Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks (1997; 2001: 163–
186) revealed, party politics in the European Union is shaped by traditional cleavage structures,
with left parties favouring more EU competence to regulate social policies, whereas parties from
the right support a neo-liberal policy at the European level. More recently, a second conflict
dimension actually seems to gain in importance. In their “postfunctionalist” theory, Hooghe and
Marks (2009) argued that a substantial mobilisation of the wider public is under way, tightly
coupling European and national politics, and replacing the permissive consensus on integration by
a “constraining dissensus”. It is thus domestic patterns of conflict over the autonomy of the nation
state as well as identity questions, structured by a “pre-material” (2009: 18) dimension of party
competition, which might determine the strategies of governments and party-leaders concerning
major issues of European integration and the transfer or defence of power. However, so far the
indications that European politics is influenced by party competition are ambiguous (e.g. Marks
and Steenbergen 2004).
By and large, recent studies in the field – whether relying on new institutionalism or on an
actor-centred approach (Marks 1996) – explicitly advocate a more comprehensive theoretical frame-
work that supplements the state-centric perspective by examining the role of ideas, interests and
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institutions in each single case (Christiansen, Falkner, and Jørgensen 2002; Rittberger and Schim-
melfennig 2006). This approach is thoroughly used in the detailed case studies on constitutional
choice and treaty reform in the EU by Gerda Falkner and her colleagues (Budden 2002, on the
Single European Act; Falkner 2002, on Maastricht; Sverdrup 2002 on Amsterdamn and Nice).
Similarly, Derek Beach (2005) took a closer look on EU institutions, thereby going beyond the
intergovernmentalism-supranationalism dichotomy. Beach traced constitutional politics of the EU
from the Single European Act to the Constitutional Treaty, emphasising the leadership role of the
Commission, the European Parliament, and in particular the Council Secretariat. He concluded
that, although EU institutions obviously play a significant role even in the most intergovernmental
bargaining forums, their impact and influence is heavily dependent on actors’ leadership resources
such as informational advantages, the context of negotiations, and the strategy applied (2005: 2-4).
In contrast to neo-functionalist and intergovernmentalist theories, institutionalist and policy-
or actor-centred approaches to European integration focus on the modes of decision-making, in
particular the relative power member state governments can exert in relation to supranational
actors. In the terminology coined by Lindberg and Scheingold (1970: 67-71), they mark a shift in
research interests from the “scope” to the “locus” of European policy. Thus they emphasise an
important aspect in the vertical dimension of multilevel political systems which is ignored in most
normative theories of federalism: The effective power of the EU or the member state governments
depends not only on competences allocated to them but also on the rules which determine how
the competences can be used in practice.
3.5 Results
Fifty years of research into European integration have produced abundant theories and explanations
for the delegation of national sovereignty to supranational institutions. Scholarly literature –
taking basic assumptions of neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism as a starting point – has
constantly developed new perspectives and introduced theoretical ideas from other research fields
to European integration theory. They explain the discontinuous, but nevertheless far-reaching shift
of competence from the national to the European level, but they also reveal that this tendency
varies between policies.
Different theoretical approaches have clearly shown the driving forces towards and the con-
straints limiting the competence transfer to the EU. Nonetheless, there is no general explanation
covering all policies or competences. Particular theories of European integration have proved more
valid for certain policy areas, institutional settings and at certain times, but still no single most con-
vincing concept prevails. As a consequence, no coherent set of competence allocation has emerged
from theoretical predictions or ex-post explanations. Moreover, with some exceptions, theories
tend to focus on the explanation of why member state governments abandon powers to the profit
of the EU. In contrast, the reasons why the allocation of competence to the European level fails are
not analysed in detail. Moreover, the available literature provides comprehensive insights into the
imbalances and asymmetries of competence allocation resulting from the dynamics of European
integration. However, scholars rarely discuss the consequences of this development for effectiveness
and legitimacy of European integration (but see Scharpf 1999).
A number of empirical studies have tried to take stock of the outcome of the integration
process (e.g. Bo¨rzel 2005; Donahue and Pollack 2001; Hix 2005: 18–23; Schmidt 1999). The
results converge in the overall picture but diverge in the details: The EU has acquired exclusive
competences in market-creating policies and shares competences with its member states in market-
correcting policies. With some exceptions (territorial cohesion, regional policy and agricultural
policy) the member states maintained their powers on redistributive issues. The increase of the
EU’s competences portrayed by these studies appears impressive. Nonetheless, it should not be
ignored that the EU still lacks the basic powers to raise taxes and to implement its policies.
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Moreover, the distinction between market-creating, market-correcting and redistributive policies
underrates the interdependencies between them which actually constrain the autonomy of the EU
and the national institutions regardless of their formal competence. Comparative federalism comes
to its limits, too, when European integration is to be explained. The evolution of the European
Community and later the European Union was the result of centralist trends similar to those we
can observe in the history of federal states. However, whereas in national federations these trends
are linked to the rise of the welfare state, in the case of European integration they concern policies
determined to limit state power.
When it comes to evaluating the detailed shift of competence from the national to the European
level, researchers are confronted with the problem of determining the meaning and the impact of
a competence. Different methods of measuring have been used which all produce quite different
results (Bo¨rzel 2005; Estella de Noriega 2002). Following studies in comparative federalism, one
can refer to the formal competences enumerated in the treaties and distinguish between legislative,
executive and fiscal powers, or rely on expert assessments. However, formal competences of EU
institutions are all but clearly stated in legal terms. Moreover, their application depends on the
ability of the Commission and the Council to make decisions. Hence, the probability of an effective
change in competence allocation is influenced by different modes of legislation and policy-making.
Obviously, budgetary figures hardly tell us anything about the relative powers of the EU and
the national levels. Furthermore, competences may have a merely symbolic value or may be
undermined by “shirking” of implementing authorities of the member states (Bednar 2004: 404),
an issue dealt with in research on compliance. Finally, EU institutions are engaged in policies
without having formal competences by using the “Open Method of Coordination”. Thus, one
serious problem of the integration literature is that we still lack a common concept of the meaning
and an agreement on the measurement of EU powers.
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4 Consequences:
Sharing of power and multilevel governance
Irrespective of the diverse results of research on the vertical allocation of competences and the
evolution of power, neither normative nor empirical theories provide convincing reasons to regard
the EU and the member states as separate jurisdictions. Empirical research on European integra-
tion did not reveal a clear drift of sovereignty from the national to the European level. Rather it
depicts political processes of dividing and sharing of competences, their content and scope being
determined in power struggles between national and European actors representing different public
or private interests. Efforts to find a coherent normative theory or at least criteria to sort out com-
petences between levels have failed or ended in more or less complicated schemes of overlapping
competences. This conforms to the fact that most powers of the EU and national or sub-national
governments are applied in patterns of multilevel governance. Scholars describe this reality with
concepts like “condominio”, “consortio” (Schmitter 1996), the “fusion of levels” (Wessels 1997),
“joint decision-making” (Scharpf 1988), “network governance” (Kohler-Koch and Eising 1999); or
“interdependent European governance” (Kohler-Koch 2003).
In response to this development, scholars began to elaborate theories of multilevel governance.
Not only have they suggested explaining European integration as the outcome of joint decisions
of national and European actors, they also have revealed that decisions on the vertical allocation
of competences usually result in an interlocking of European, national and sub-national levels.
Consequently, the transfer of powers to the EU should no longer be considered as a zero-sum game,
rather it is about finding ways to deal with interdependent tasks reaching beyond boundaries of
national governments.
The multilevel governance approach got widespread acknowledgement through the work of
Hooghe and Marks (2001), although it is disputed whether they formulated a new theory (Jordan
2001; for a review of the debate: Bache and Flinders 2004 Conzelmann and Smith 2008). They
started from empirical research on European regional policy and on the mobilisation of sub-national
actors in EU policy-making. The results of these studies, which were confirmed by new data (Marks,
Hooghe, and Schakel 2008) revealed that regionalisation, i.e. shifting powers from the national to
the sub-national level, parallels the increasing transfer of competences to the European level. The
interplay of these two processes implies that European integration is neither a continuous process
nor an established political structure but an always contested issue (Hooghe and Marks 2001: 28).
What we observe is not just the establishment of another level of politics but instead the evolution
of “a system of continuous negotiations among nested governments at several territorial tiers”
(Marks 1993: 392). Instead of governments operating in their territorially demarcated jurisdiction,
“variable combinations of governments on multiple layers of authority – European, national, and
subnational – form policy networks for collaboration. The relations are characterised by mutual
interdependence on each others’ resources, not by competition for scarce resources” (Hooghe 1996:
18).
This approach on multilevel governance disaggregates states into actors involved in European
politics. Instead of looking at the interplay between national governments and the European Union,
attention is focussed on multiple actors including regional governments, national governments and
parliaments, the European Commission and the European Parliament, as well as on their patterns
of interaction, which are described as networks and negotiations. It goes without saying that such
an analytical perspective is better suited to comprehending the complexity of European politics
than functionalist, intergovernmentalist or even institutionalist approaches. It sheds light on the
dynamics of interdependent policy-making and the flexibility of structures, in which supranational
actors participate more as political entrepreneurs than as holders of particular competences. In
any case, the concept of multilevel governance strongly challenges the assumption that any kind
of vertical allocation of competences between levels can determine policy-making.
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As fruitful as this approach may be, its conclusions remain a bit vague, so far. Although Hooghe
and Marks rightly emphasised the dynamics and flexibility of the European political structure, they
did not clearly carve out the mechanisms which can explain the dynamics of policy-making and the
outcomes. What they cannot explain either is why and how such a complicated political system
works fairly well. Their suggestion to link research on EU multilevel governance to comparative
federalism (Hooghe and Marks 2003) highlights a way to come to terms with this question.
The challenge to understand, how multilevel governance works, stimulated a second strand of
theoretical reasoning and empirical research. It has been mainly nourished by contributions from
German scholars. This line of research was established by Fritz W. Scharpf’s thought-provoking
theory of the joint-decision trap (Scharpf 1988). This theory was formulated to explain the blockade
of European integration in the 1970s and early 1980s by comparing the institutional setting of
European policy-making with Germany’s cooperative federalism. Both constituted multilateral
negotiation systems in which actors are compelled to find an agreement. If these actors have to
decide on redistributive issues, policy-making would be likely doomed to fail. To make things
even worse, the institutional structures of joint decision-making could be changed only under very
specific circumstances. Governments compelled to cooperate in multilevel governance might be
frustrated with political stalemate, but they would be hardly able to come to an agreement on an
institutional reform which essentially entails a redistribution of power.
This negative portrait of European governance was not only questioned by the dynamics of
integration after 1989 but also contested by empirical research and in theoretical discourses. Studies
on regional policy (e.g. Bache 2007; Marks 1993) showed that EU multilevel governance differs in
several respects from the structures and processes in German federalism. The greater number of
actors at the national and sub-national level makes simultaneous negotiations impossible and leads
to a sequential process of policy-making in multi- and bilateral relations. Moreover, the influence
of party competition on negotiations among governments, which has a problematic impact on
policy-making in German federalism, does not play a significant role in the European context.
Finally, the Commission – as an independent agenda setter and administration – can moderate
distributive conflicts. Therefore, in a comparative perspective, the EU has been labelled as a
loosely coupled multilevel system (Benz 2000, 2003). Adrienne He´ritier (1999) showed in a series
of case studies, actors in EU policy-making find ways to escape imminent situations of deadlock
by changing patterns of interaction or by using flexibilities of complex institutional settings and
inter-institutional processes. In addition, Edgar Grande (1996) pointed out that governments
can gain autonomy against powerful interest groups if they pool their competences in multilevel
governance. All these findings explain the rather high effectiveness of multilevel policy-making in
the EU and the continuous change in patterns of interactions which allow avoiding stalemate in
decision-making (Benz 2009a; Wallace 2001).
Fritz W. Scharpf himself refined his earlier theory based on a review of studies on European
policy-making. He concluded that the leeway of actors in European politics varies from policy
to policy (Scharpf 1997). Moreover, he acknowledged the role of the Commission as an agenda-
setter in negotiations, the existence of hierarchical governance by the European Central Bank and
the European Court of Justice as well as the option of flexible integration to evade veto-power
(Scharpf 2006). As a consequence, the interplay between European, national and sub-national
actors differs accordingly. This approach raises tremendously the complexity of the analysis. In an
article summarising his theoretical reasoning on EU multilevel governance, Scharpf (2001) proposed
dealing with this complexity by avoiding a grand theory and by focussing theorizing on particular
modes of governance and the conditions under which they arise and work. He extended his concepts
of joint decision-making by including mutual adjustment, hierarchy and negotiations as modes of
European governance.
With this analytical framework, it is possible to integrate different theoretical perspectives into
the study of multilevel governance. Mutual adjustment means that governments coordinate their
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policy by strategic action and reaction without direct communication. In the common market
and in the decentralised polity of the EU, this mode necessarily leads to competition between
governments. In order to understand the mechanisms at work, we can refer to economic theory on
institutional competition (e.g. Vanberg and Kerber 1994). However, in contrast to these theories,
political science has to take into account the influence of internal veto players in competing gov-
ernments, which might limit the scope of mutual adjustment. Hierarchy as a mode of multilevel
governance should be understood as asymmetric interaction between principals and agents in a
vertically differentiated structure, rather than as governing by command and control. Problems of
coordination in hierarchies have at length been analysed in institutional economics, which, there-
fore, can be used as a basis for studying this mode of multilevel governance. In order to understand
intergovernmental negotiations, a wide range of theories are available which suggest distinguishing
between bargaining and arguing or between different structures of negotiations (bilateral or mul-
tilateral) or between different types of actors (representatives, agents, experts), to name just the
most relevant categories. Joint decision-making combines aspects of multilateral intergovernmental
negotiations and hierarchical agenda-setting, but governments negotiating at the European level
have to consider decision-making in their parliaments and to interests of powerful pressure groups.
Therefore, agreements on redistributive policies are unlikely in this setting and this explains why
the member states maintained core functions of the welfare state(Scharpf 2001: 16).
Such a “modularisation” of the theory of multilevel governance points out a promising research
strategy to cope with the complexity of the field (see Benz 2009b). However, real policy-making,
in particular multilevel governance in the EU, results from a combination of these basic modes of
governance. As indicated by Scharpf in his description of joint decision-making, they may combine
mechanisms of negotiation, hierarchy and political competition, or they may include negotiations in
networks working in the shadow of hierarchical control. Decisions on regulatory policies negotiated
in the EU Council are influenced by the more or less intense competition among member states
for mobile tax-payers or by party competition in the member states. Depending on the type of
mechanism and the quality of coupling (strict or loose), these diverse mechanisms of governance
can be positively or negatively linked, i.e. they can reinforce actors’ interests to coordinate their
policies or they can cause conflicts and divergent incentives. A theory of multilevel governance in
the EU must take these interactive effects into account.
It should not be ignored that one way of coping with the wicked problems of multilevel gov-
ernance is to change the allocation of powers. Dilemmas of collective action usually entrenched
in complicated structures of decision-making can be avoided by shifting issues to institutional or
constitutional policy. Consequently, in governance research the issue of “meta-governance” has
attracted attention (Jessop 2005). In the same line, scholars working on comparative federalism
emphasise the dynamic and fluid character of multilevel systems when competences concern in-
terdependent tasks or powers are shared (Pagano and Leonardi 2007). At this point of reasoning,
theories of multilevel governance meet theories of federalism with the latter keeping a focus on the
allocation of powers and the former indicating mechanisms which cause dynamics and changes.
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5 Prospects for further research
Given the tremendous amount of literature on European integration treating – in one way or
another – the allocation of competence between member states and the EU, this Living Review
could not cover all contributions and had to be selective. Nevertheless, our overview on nor-
mative concepts and empirical research has revealed a lot of different theoretical and analytical
approaches, stimulating ongoing discussion and research in this field. Despite the unique features
of the European political system, we regard comparative research as particularly fruitful. Studies
on comparative federalism can really sharpen our understanding of alternative options for the allo-
cation of competences and of the driving forces and counter-forces of integration. Yet this research
seems to be more fruitful if it clarifies the differences between the EU and existing federations than
if it emphasises similarities. On the other hand, theories of European integration and multilevel
governance point out the complexity of structures and a plurality of factors influencing how pow-
ers are distributed between levels. Since this complexity is difficult to cope with in comparative
research designs, there is no one best research strategy. Therefore, further research in this field
should, in principle, continue to apply different approaches and designs.
Furthermore, this Living Review has identified some weaknesses of concepts used in the lit-
erature and also deficits in empirical research. Normative theories tend to overemphasise the
possibility of separating powers. This perspective also appears as an implicit assumption in empir-
ical theories which explain the shift or the delegation of powers from the national to the European
level. Moreover, these theories often focus too much on integration, while leaving aside the driv-
ing forces towards disintegration or decentralisation of powers. Normative theories of federalism,
originally introduced to study the EU from a comparative political science perspective, have been
developed for and discussed mainly with regard to federal states. As we have seen, they are only of
limited value with regard to the EU polity, which is characterised by federal as well as confederal
elements, and does not allow for a clear-cut allocation of competences via constitutional rules.
Moreover, both abstract normative reasoning on an ideal allocation of competences as well as rec-
ommendations of devices to implement subsidiarity underestimate the “stickiness” of multilevel
structures. Due to diverging interests of member states and path dependency of institutions al-
ready set in place, the political system of the EU cannot be deliberately shaped by “constitutional
design”. How powers are shared in practice depends on the interplay between the EU institutions
and member state governments, parliaments or interest groups, to name but the most important
actors. Moreover, in the highly differentiated system of the EU, the effective powers of single
actors, institutions, or jurisdictions are dependent on and defined by the rules of decision-making,
on the issue at stake and the particular modes of multilevel governance.
Nonetheless, the EU’s political system is driven by inherent dynamics of change. Empirical
theories as well as normative reasoning suggesting a balanced and efficient allocation of competences
between jurisdictions have to take into account that actors at different levels influence the effective
allocation of competences. Thus they even may change the actual balance of power unilaterally
(see Faber and Wessels 2006 for an analysis of potential strategies and perspectives of the European
Council). If this is ignored, studies end up with idealistic recommendations, which are futile as
regards reality.
Still, empirical theories often tend to focus on a two-tiered structure of the EU. However,
since the early 1950s, the process of European integration has passed through cycles of increasing
differentiation (Wessels 1997). As a result, today’s EU is not a coherent political system in a given
territory but is characterised by a highly diversified and fragmented structure. Empirical research
on integration dynamics and the transfer of competences must consider this specific structure in
order to generate a more precise picture of the actual processes and developments. In this respect,
comparative research on federalism can disclose new perspectives concerning causes, patterns and
consequences of intergovernmental relations in view of the different constitutional systems, types
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of democracies, party systems or societal conditions at the national and sub-national levels.
When studying competence allocation as well as different patterns of cooperation, one needs to
distinguish between policy areas featuring varying degrees of institutionalisation, different decision-
making procedures and actors involved in policy-making. Countless case studies of European
policy-making emphasise the particular characteristics of each policy field. They preclude re-
searchers to identify consistent and uniform patterns of competence allocation or rather unidirec-
tional “integration” in the European multilevel polity (see Lindberg and Scheingold 1970). More
recently, the varying territorial scope of policy programmes or fields of cooperation on the Eu-
ropean level has been reconsidered, an idea that has been discussed in terms like “Europe at
different pace”, “Kerneuropa”, or “Europe a` la carte”. It has gained new momentum in view of
the successive enlargement rounds and the incorporation of the provisions on closer cooperation
in Art. 20 TEU and Art. 326–334 TFEU. Future research will need to focus more on the causes
and consequences of a territorially differentiated competence allocation. Whether this is correctly
covered by the term functional federalism has to be discussed.
In particular with regard to enlargement, the failed ratification of a European constitutional
treaty and the opting-out and secession clauses of the Lisbon Treaty, possible tendencies of dis-
integration should be taken into account more seriously. Growing economic, social and cultural
inequalities between member states, increasing scepticism of the population and a firm commit-
ment of national parliaments and governments to the principle of subsidiarity might dissolve the
formerly prevailing commitment to the creation of “an ever closer union” (Art. 1 TEU). But again
this will probably not lead to a simple up- and downward movement of competences between levels
but to a simultaneous integration and disintegration in different policy areas, and probably in
different territories, too. As a consequence, we have to expect a variety of shifts in power between
interlocked levels of the EU.
For these reasons, empirical research on European integration in general can still gain a lot by
adopting “a plurality of lower-level and simpler concepts” (Scharpf 2001: 4) in order to appropri-
ately analyse the vertical dimension of the EU, instead of relying on rival theoretical concepts like
intergovernmentalism and supranationalism, not to speak of new holistic approaches of multilevel
governance (see also Peterson 2001). We may regard the European Union as a political system sui
generis. But when dealing with the vertical allocation of competence and the application of shared
powers in multilevel governance, we should avoid overarching concepts or a grand theory. In view
of the complexity of the field, they cannot provide a reasonable and useful basis for research.
Instead, in agreement with Scharpf, we suggest to combine inductive and deductive approaches
of theory-building, to develop and test of a variety of concrete theories and models. Starting
with concepts of a limited range, i.e. those related to particular patterns of governance, we will
be better prepared to find out where dynamics of integration produce incompatible structures or
where they create self-enforcing mechanisms towards either integration or disintegration. Hence,
we would expect research on European governance to yield some interesting new insights when
placing emphasis on specific patterns of multilevel governance instead of trying to cover the whole
picture.
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